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THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEFERRAL:
LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF THE 2004
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN
Shamshad Pasarlay†
Abstract: In an important recent work, Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg
noted that constitution writers regularly choose to defer to the future important questions
of constitutional design. They argue that an “optimal” level of constitutional deferral
might contribute to constitutional stability and help constitutions live longer. This Article
argues that although constitution makers might choose to defer on many important
questions of constitutional design to promote agreement, certain types of deferral might
turn out to be counterproductive, and thus constitution writers’ choice to defer should be
limited. The Article highlights that it is risky to defer to future legislatures the powers of
institutions (such as apex courts) that are empowered under the constitution to answer
other implicit deferrals. Deferring the powers of apex courts is extremely dangerous
because such deferrals can potentially politicize the courts’ relationship with the political
branches of the government. In response, the political branches of government might
choose to resolve deferrals on the powers of apex courts in a retaliatory fashion that could
limit the powers of apex courts and undermine the legitimacy and independence.
Deferrals on the powers of the judiciary may simply give downstream legislatures a tool
to hold apex courts hostage by threatening to amend their laws and strip them of their
powers. To highlight this problem, this Article explores the decision of the makers of the
2004 Constitution of Afghanistan to defer on the powers of the Supreme Court and the
Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution
to interpret the Constitution and exercise all types of judicial review. Afghanistan’s
experience operating under the 2004 Constitution gives an important example of the
limits of constitutional deferral.
Cite as: Shamshad Pasarlay, The Limits of Constitutional Deferral: Lessons from the
History of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 683 (2018).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Constitution writers often work under challenging conditions. In an
ideal world, they might be able to draft a perfect constitution—one that
elaborates fully the values of the state and the decision-making processes by
which the state would realize those values in the future. Nevertheless,
constitution makers face serious constraints (such as time, political interests,
and minimum consensus) that make agreement on important questions a
concern for constitution drafting. These constraints most often force
constitution makers to defer to the future important questions of
constitutional design, including issues of government structure, basic rights,
†
PhD, University of Washington School of Law (2016); Senior Lecturer, Herat University School
of Law and Political Sciences.
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and judicially enforceable limits on government conduct. 1 Theorists of
constitutional deferral argue that certain types of deferrals can occasionally
be useful in promoting productive ongoing negotiations of contested
constitutional principles and thus can help a constitution endure longer. 2
However, these theorists state that deferrals are not optimal for all issues of
constitutional design. Specifically, they are not in favor of the idea that
constitutions should leave some important questions of governmental
structure undecided.3
Building on this insight, this Article explores a type of dangerous
deferral in constitutional design. It highlights that constitution makers might
choose to defer strategically on many important questions of constitutional
design, but not all types of deferral are useful. Certain types of
constitutional deferral are indeed counterproductive. 4 For instance, it is
dangerous to defer on the powers of apex courts that are empowered under
the constitution to answer other implicit deferrals in a constitution.
Deferrals on the powers of apex courts can result in political conflicts
between the judiciary and the political branches of the government that can
threaten the independence and institutional security of the judiciary. 5
Moreover, downstream legislatures may refuse to empower courts to resolve
implicit constitutional deferrals, leading to critical constitutional crises every
time a constitutional dispute emerges between the political branches of the
government.
To highlight the dangers associated with deferrals on the powers of
apex courts, this Article explores the decision of the makers of the 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan to defer on the powers of the Supreme Court
and the Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation
of the Constitution (“the Commission”) to interpret the Constitution and
exercise all types of judicial review functions. This Article shows how
deferrals in this respect exacerbated political tensions between the legislature
and the judiciary, creating a political crisis over which institution should
1
See generally Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in
Constitutional Design, 9 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 636 (2011).
2
Id.; see also Clark B. Lombardi, The Constitution as an Agreement to Agree: The Social and
Political Foundation (and Effects) of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 398, 425–26 (Dennis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
3
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 664–66; see also Hanna Lerner, Constitution-Writing in
Deeply Divided Societies: The Incrementalist Approach, 16 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 68, 84 (2010).
4
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 664.
5
Lerner, supra note 3, at 84.

June 2018

The Limits of Constitutional Deferral

685

interpret the Constitution and review the constitutionality of legislation.
This Article further shows how the legislature used deferrals to refuse to
empower the Supreme Court to exercise its constitutional right to interpret
the Constitution and exercise all types of judicial review functions. In fact,
the legislature took advantage of deferrals in these areas to undermine the
independence and institutional viability of the Supreme Court and the
Commission. 6 On certain occasions, the legislature and the executive
threatened to amend the laws that define the powers of the Supreme Court
and the Commission—a counterproductive development and one which the
Supreme Court and the Commission both have no power to evade.7
The rest of this Article is organized as follows: Part II describes the
literature on constitutional deferral and constitutional ambiguity. It then
discusses the effects of these types of deferrals on both constitutional
stability and longevity. Part III explores the decision of the drafters of the
2004 Constitution of Afghanistan to defer the powers of the Supreme Court
and the Commission to the ordinary legislature. Part IV explores how
deferral on the powers of the Supreme Court and the Commission resulted in
direct political confrontation between the judiciary and the legislature,
triggering a political crisis over constitutional interpretation and judicial
review in Afghanistan. This Part further reveals that the executive and the
legislature both took advantage of these deferrals, partially resolving them in
a way that served their interests and weakened both the Supreme Court and
the Commission. Part V reveals how the legislature is holding the law of the
Commission hostage by threatening to amend it and strip the Commission of
its powers every time the Commission’s decisions do not align with the
interests of the legislature.
Finally, Part VI concludes by highlighting that the powers and
structure of institutions (such as constitutional courts) entrusted by a
constitution to resolve implicit deferrals might be the most important aspect
of a constitution and that it needs to be decided at the outset by
constitutional framers. By failing to resolve the important issue of the
powers of highest courts within a constitution, the framers might render the
6

See Shamshad Pasarlay, When Courts Decide Not to Decide: Understanding the Afghan Supreme
Court’s Struggle to Decide the Fate of the Dismissed Ministers, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/03/when-courts-decide-not-to-decide-understanding-the-afghansupreme-courts-struggle-to-decide-the-fate-of-the-dismissed-ministers/.
7
Id.
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day-to-day function of government extremely difficult. Specifically, in
fragile and nascent democracies like Afghanistan, the legislature may be illsuited to define the powers of the judiciary to resolve other implicit deferrals
in the Constitution. In fact, downstream legislatures might simply strip the
judiciary of such powers. In these contexts, unresolved questions of the
powers and organization of highest courts engender costly political crises
every time a dispute emerges between the legislature and the executive over
a constitutional question.
II.

THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEFERRAL

In many countries, the moment of constitution-making is often
considered an exceptional period of time, one in which the society’s focus
on constitutional provisions and on the rewards of consensus create unique
opportunities. According to this view, constitution makers should thus be
encouraged to answer foundationally important questions about the state up
front so that the polity can move on with a shared set of values and
commitments to the state.8 It is at this founding moment that a society is
most likely to get the best possible answers on fundamental questions of
constitutional design. However, at the same time, the moment of
constitutional founding is also a dangerous period of time riddled with high
passions and interests. Drafting a constitution under such conditions usually
involves making choices under constraints, including lack of agreement,
resources, time, and information. 9 These constraints might lead to
significant “decision” and “error” costs if drafters attempt to answer all
important questions of constitutional design at the time of constitution
writing.10
Moreover, in deeply divided societies, 11 the constitutional founding
moment is considered the worst possible time for people to try and settle

8
See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); CARL SCHMITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2008); Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the
Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE. L.J. 364 (1995).
9
See generally Elster, supra note 8.
10
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 641–46.
11
A society is deeply divided if it (1) contains a variety of different ethnic, religious, linguistic, or
cultural communities; and (2) the ethno-cultural, religious, or other societal cleavages in the society form
basis of political mobilization and translate into political fragmentation over a substantial period of time
and a wide variety of issues. See Ian Lustick, Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Constitutionalism
versus Control, 31 WORLD POL. 325 (1979); Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and
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foundational questions of constitutional design, including questions of
national identity and religious values. 12 In countries marked by such
divisions, the process of constitution-making is fraught with great risk of
political crisis. 13 In these deeply divided societies, it might not be
productive to pressure groups with different ethnic and/or religious identities
to agree in advance upon foundational questions of national and religious
identity. Because there is no minimum consensus, if people of a deeply
divided society focus on these foundational questions at the drafting stage, it
will only highlight their differences and might lead to political crisis.14 Each
ethno-religious community might try to use the constitutional process to
maximize its own interests, making agreement on foundational questions of
a polity extremely difficult.
As a result, to avoid costs associated with constitutional design and
promote agreement at the drafting stage, constitution makers sometimes
choose to leave some significant questions undecided, or defer them to the
future. 15 Specifically, in deeply divided countries, constitutional deferral
plays a constructive role. It enables constitution framers to distract attention
from the most divisive issues until after institutions and habits of democratic
discourse have taken root, allowing these societies to create workable
arrangements by which less fundamental issues can be resolved to people’s
mutual satisfaction.16 In short, deferral allows deeply divided countries to
keep the debate on controversial issues ongoing and resolve them through
constructive dialogue after the drafting stage.
Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg define constitutional deferral as a
conscious decision by constitution writers not to decide a contentious
(though equally important) question of constitutional design in the
constitution, thereby leaving it to be decided through the process of ordinary
politics by ordinary institutions, namely the legislature and the judiciary. 17
Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION 5 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008).
12
See generally HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES (2011);
see also Asli Bâli & Hanna Lerner, Constitutional Design without Constitutional Moment: Lessons from
Religiously Divided Societies, 49 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 227, 228–29 (2016).
13
See LERNER, supra note 12, at 1; see also Lerner, supra note 3, at 68–69.
14
See Bâli & Lerner, supra note 12, at 228–29; see also Lerner, supra note 3.
15
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 636–37; see also Mark Tushnet, Constitution-Making: An
Introduction, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1983, 2007 (2013).
16
See LERNER, supra note 12; Bâli & Lerner, supra note 12, at 293.
17
See Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 637.
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That is to say, constitution makers often avoid any attempt to resolve in the
constitutional text certain important constitutional questions.18 Instead, they
leave future political institutions freedom to resolve those questions at some
less fraught time in the future when greater consensus is formed and the risk
of decision and error cost has faded.19
Theorists of constitutional deferral have identified several different
types of constitutional deferral. The first type explicitly identifies an
important issue of constitutional design and states that it is to be resolved by
the future legislature after the constitution is promulgated. 20 This type of
deferral uses a “by-law clause” in the text of the constitution, and is the
method on which Dixon and Ginsburg focus their attention. 21 Deferrals
through by-law clauses indicate that constitution writers wish to
constitutionalize an important question of constitutional design in some
form, but because of the lack of agreement on the answers to such questions
and/or lack of information that might lead to decision costs, they do not
attempt to answer them in the text of the constitution. 22 Constitution
designers instead choose to leave these questions for future resolution by the
legislature.23
Another common form of deferral is implicit constitutional deferral,
or deferral of significant constitutional questions to constitutional courts.24
In this case, constitution writers strategically and deliberately use unclear,
ambiguous, or ambivalent language to describe a structural constitutional
rule or a constitutional right, thus implicitly deferring particular
constitutional provisions to the future.25 Implicit constitutional deferral thus
does not attempt to resolve a controversial question in the constitution.
Instead, it requires that the ambiguous constitutional rule should be
interpreted and resolved in the future by institutions entrusted by the

18

Id.
Id. at 638.
20
Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2009; Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 643–46.
21
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 639–50.
22
Id. at 639–40.
23
Id.
24
Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2007; Lombardi, supra note 2, at 409.
25
Lombardi, supra note 2, at 409; see also CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONS DO 96 (2001) (discussing the strategic uses of ambiguity and deferral in constitutiondrafting).
19
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constitution that have the power to interpret the constitution and resolve
constitutional ambiguities.26
Scholars of constitutional deferral are not only interested in
typologizing deferral but also in its impacts on constitutional optimality,
longevity, and stability. 27 They argue that an “optimal” level of
constitutional deferral can occasionally be useful in promoting productive
ongoing negotiations of constitutional principles and thus might contribute
to constitutional stability and help constitutions survive longer. 28 This
Article does not intend to question this claim. In fact, the history of Afghan
constitutions in general, and that of the 2004 Constitution in particular,
provides evidence to support the claim that an optimal level of constitutional
deferral might help constitutions endure longer.29
However, constitutional deferrals are not optimal for all issues of
constitutional design. Dixon and Ginsburg point out that it is important that
constitution writers do not rely on deferral too much. They must settle
within the constitution certain basic procedural questions that are important
and enable the democratic function of the government. 30 Theorists of
constitutional deferral warn that deferral should not impede the ability of
government institutions (legislatures or courts) to resolve key constitutional
questions in the future. 31 This impediment will negatively impact the
survival and the expected optimality of constitutions. These types of
deferrals are likely “to undermine popular support for the existing
constitutional system in a way that also increases support for efforts to create
new governmental arrangements by extra-constitutional means.”32 This is
exactly what happened in Afghanistan in the 1970s. 33 The 1964 Afghan
26

Lombardi, supra note 2, at 409.
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 643–46; Lombardi, supra note 2, at 409; Shamshad Pasarlay,
Rethinking Afghanistan’s Longest-Lived Constitution: The 1931 Constitution Through the Lens of
Constitutional Endurance and Performance Literature, 10 ELON L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2018)
[hereinafter Pasarlay, Rethinking Afghanistan’s Longest-Lived Constitution].
28
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 663–67; Lombardi supra note 2, at 426.
29
See Shamshad Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan: A History and Analysis
Through the Lens of Coordination and Deferral Theory, 261–302 (June 10, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pasarlay, Making the 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan]; see also Pasarlay, Rethinking Afghanistan’s Longest-Lived Constitution,
supra note 27, at 104.
30
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 664.
31
Id. at 666; see also Lerner, supra note 3, at 84.
32
Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 666.
33
See generally Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Fall of a Monarchy in Afghanistan, 9 INT’L. J.
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 195 (1978).
27
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Constitution had legalized the formation of political parties, but it deferred
to the legislature to define the structure and organizations of political
parties.34 However, the implementing legislation was never ratified. This
failure not only deprived Afghanistan of an important tool for
institutionalizing democracy, but it also led to the collapse of the 1964
constitutional order and the monarchy that it had established.35
Similarly, the history of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan thus far
indicates that it is important that constitution makers settle the powers of
apex courts that are expected to resolve other implicit deferrals. Authorizing
downstream legislatures to define the powers of the judiciary by using a bylaw clause in the constitution is extremely dangerous. These deferrals might
result in direct political conflicts between the legislature and the judiciary
that may in turn undermine the judiciary’s independence and institutional
security. In other words, deferrals on the powers and organization of apex
constitutional courts might mean that these courts fail to resolve
fundamental constitutional questions in the future. These dangers can affect
the expected optimality, stability, and longevity of written constitutions and,
in nascent democracies like Afghanistan, might create serious problems by
making constitutions more fragile.
III.

THE 2002–2004 CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF
THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLES 121 AND 157 OF THE 2004 CONSTITUTION

Following the removal of the Taliban regime in October 2001, the
United Nations (“UN”) brought together leading Afghan groups to Bonn,
Germany, to discuss plans for a future government in Afghanistan.36 The
meeting in Germany resulted in the signing of the Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions, commonly known as the Bonn Agreement (“the
Agreement”).37 The Agreement set up a timetable for a two-year transitional
34

THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN [AFG. CONST. 1964] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 1, 1964, art. 32.
See Mohammad Hasan Kakar, The Fall of the Afghan Monarchy in 1973, 9 INT’L J. MIDDLE E.
STUD. 195, 199, 207–08, 214 (1978).
36
See generally ZALMAY KHALILZAD, THE ENVOY: FROM KABUL TO THE WHITE HOUSE, MY
JOURNEY THROUGH A TURBULENT WORLD (2016); see also JAMES DOBBINS, AFTER THE TALIBAN:
NATION-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN (2008); Chris Johnson et al., AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. 3 (2003).
37
J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 557, 566
(2007).
35
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period.38 It established an interim government that would be followed by a
transitional administration. 39
The Transitional Administration was
responsible for drafting a new constitution within eighteen months after it
was established. 40
The Transitional Administration initiated the
constitution-making process in October 2002 when President Hamid Karzai
appointed the Constitutional Drafting Commission to prepare a first draft of
the new constitution.41 The process ended in January 2004 when President
Karzai signed and promulgated the new Constitution of Afghanistan.42
The text of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan makes clear that the
people involved in its drafting and revision engaged in systematic
constitutional deferrals.43 Deferrals in the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan
came explicitly through by-law clauses and, in some places, implicitly
through strategic ambiguity. 44 For instance, the framers of the 2004
Constitution engaged in very heated debates over ideology, particularly over
the question of whether Islamic values or liberal principles should place
limits on legislative and executive discretion. 45 However, when the
Constitution was written, the drafters managed to develop ambiguous
formulas that did not seem to resolve the contested ideological questions.46
All factions involved in the 2002–2004 constitutional negotiations appeared
to have found the language acceptable even though (and perhaps because) it
was ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations, thus leaving to another
time and another institution the question of what types of ideological
principles the government would have to respect.47
In many other places, the makers of the 2004 Constitution apparently
chose to defer explicitly through adopting by-law clauses in the text of the

38

See generally U.N. Secretary General, Letter dated Dec. 5, 2001 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001).
39
Id. ¶¶ I.1–4.
40
Id. ¶ 6.
41
Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2004, at 5, 10.
42
See generally id.
43
Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, supra note 29, at 173.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Nathan J. Brown, Bargaining and Imposing Constitutions: Private and Public Interests in the
Iranian, Afghani, and Iraqi Constitutional Experiments, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCES TO TURKEY, IRAQ, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN 72 (Said Amir Arjomand ed.,
2008).
47
Id.
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Constitution.48 For instance, the text of the 2004 Constitution attempts to
guarantee liberal democracy and governance by providing a long list of
protected rights and freedoms, including social, political, and property
rights.49 Nevertheless, the Constitution does not simply declare most rights
to be constitutionally guaranteed. Rather, it attempts to constitutionalize
basic rights in some ways and instructs the downstream legislature through
the adoption of by-law clauses to define the scope of the protected rights and
freedoms and then to enact laws that would define the powers of the
institutions that will protect those rights.50
In this way, the makers of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan
deployed deferral as a strategic tool.51 In fact, constitutional deferral helped
them to reach agreement and build minimum consensus on many
contentious questions of constitutional design at the drafting stage, including
basic rights and the ideology of the state.52 In a perfect scenario, the drafters
of the 2004 Constitution might have elaborated more fully the values of the
state and the scope of liberal rights that the Constitution purported to
guarantee. However, in a situation where Afghanistan’s powerful and wellarmed divided communities did not agree on foundational issues, they
accepted that the final deal would have to be negotiated incrementally. 53
Both Afghan elites and society seem to be happy maintaining the deferred
order on these aspects of constitutional design and have opted to resolve
them over time as greater consensus is forged.54
A.

The Drafters’ Decision to Defer the Powers of the Supreme
Court and the Commission to Exercise Judicial Review

Judicial review and constitutional interpretation—particularly, the
question of where to vest the power to issue binding judicial review
opinions—was a contentious issue during the drafting of the 2004
Constitution of Afghanistan.55 At first, the makers of the 2004 Constitution
48

Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, supra note 29, at 172–260.
QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [AFG. CONST. 2004] [CONSTITUTION] Jan.
26, 2004, arts. 22–57.
50
Id.
51
Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, supra note 29, at 261–66.
52
Id. at 172–302.
53
Id. at 261–302.
54
Id.
55
Shamshad Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Review in Afghanistan: Is
There Still a Crisis?, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/03/
49
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proposed a separate and independent constitutional court with explicit
powers to interpret the Constitution and exercise constitutional review. 56
However, the then-president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai opposed the
constitutional court, arguing that it would become something like the Iranian
Council of Guardians that would use constitutional provisions, specifically
those dealing with Islam and the sharia, to undermine the political system
and strike down legislation on religious grounds. 57 Karzai and his allies
ultimately succeeded in removing the constitutional court from the draft
Constitution before the draft was adopted.58
When the makers of the 2004 Constitution dropped the proposed
constitutional court, they vested the Supreme Court with the power to
exercise judicial review and interpret the Constitution.59 Article 121 of the
draft Constitution, submitted to the Constitutional Loya Jirga (the popular
body that adopted the 2004 Constitution) for approval, stated: “at the
request of the government and courts, the Supreme Court shall review the
compliance of laws, legislative decrees and international treaties with the
constitution; the Supreme Court shall have the power to interpret laws,
legislative decrees, international treaties and the Constitution.”60
During debates at the Constitutional Loya Jirga (“CLJ”), judicial
review and constitutional interpretation once again took center stage. The
majority of the delegates at the CLJ opposed the provisions of the draft
Constitution that gave the Supreme Court the power to exercise judicial
review and interpret the Constitution.61 They complained that such a clericdominated Supreme Court would compromise fundamental rights, especially
the rights of women and minorities, by using vague sharia law provisions,

constitutional-interpretation-and-constitutional-review-in-afghanistan-is-there-still-a-crisis/
[hereinafter,
Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation]; see also John Dempsey & J. Alexander Thier, Resolving the Crisis
over Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan, PEACE BRIEFING (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Washington, D.C.),
Mar. 2009, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/USIP_0309_2.PDF.
56
See Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 55; Dempsey & Thier, supra note 55.
57
See Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 55; Dempsey & Thier, supra note 55.
58
Said Amir Arjomand, Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan: A Comparative and Historical
Perspective, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 943, 959 (2005).
59
Constitutional Drafting Comm’n, Draft Constitution of Afghanistan as Revised by the Executive,
art. 121 (Dec. 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Const. Draft of 2003].
60
Id. (emphasis added).
61
Int’l Crisis Grp., Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, at 16, Asia Report No. 195 (Nov. 17,
2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/124332/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary
.pdf.
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such as Article 3 of the Constitution, as justification.62 Article 3 states that
“no law shall contradict the provisions and the beliefs of the sacred religion
of Islam.” 63 The proponents of the constitutional court argued that the
Supreme Court, as it was then comprised of mullahs (those versed in sharia
law only), who were not trained in public law or constitutional law, should
not be the institution to interpret the Constitution and exercise judicial
review.64 Karzai and his supporters, however, continued to argue against
including a constitutional court in the country’s next Constitution.65
The discussion over the constitutional court at the CLJ seemed to be
going nowhere, “ending in deadlock between the majority of the CLJ
members and the supporters of President Karzai.”66 To break the stalemate
and achieve a minimum agreement on which institution should interpret the
Constitution, the CLJ and President Karzai ultimately agreed on a
Commission that would oversee the implementation of the Constitution. 67
Although it was no replacement for a constitutional court, the CLJ hoped
that the establishment of the Commission would go “a small way to repair
the absence of a constitutional court and may one day counter the clerical
domination of the Supreme Court.”68 However, the final draft Constitution
did not clarify how the Commission was to be organized and what powers it
would enjoy.69 It remained intentionally unclear whether the Commission
was empowered to issue binding substantive interpretations of the
Constitution, meaning that the Commission would interpret the Constitution
and the Supreme Court would be obliged to rule in accordance with the
Commission’s reading of the Constitution.
B.

The Commission and Its Unclear Mandate

Although the CLJ finalized the 2004 Constitution, it did not define the
powers of the Commission. In other words, the CLJ deferred the powers of
62

Id. at 8; Arjomand, supra note 58, at 959.
AFG. CONST. 2004 art. 3.
64
Int’l Crisis Grp., Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga, at 8–9, Asia Briefing No. 29 (Dec.
12, 2003),, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/afghanistan-the-constitutional-loya-jirga.pdf; see also
Rubin, supra note 41, at 15.
65
Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 55; Dempsey & Thier, supra note 55.
66
Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, supra note 29, at 250.
67
Arjomand, supra note 58, at 960.
68
Id.
69
Constitutional Drafting Comm’n, Draft Constitution of Afghanistan as Adopted by the
Constitutional Loya Jirga, art. 157 (Jan. 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Const. Draft of 2004].
63
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the Commission to the legislature. The CLJ-approved version of the
Commission in draft Article 157 looked like the following: “An Independent
Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution
should be established in accordance with the provisions of the law.” 70
Article 157 is deliberately ambiguous as to whether the Commission is
empowered to interpret the Constitution or exercise judicial review.
This last minute inclusion of the Commission into the draft
Constitution begot confusion over which institution should exercise all
forms of judicial review and interpret the Constitution. 71 The confusion
arose primarily because of the explicit and implicit deferrals in Articles 121
and 157 of the CLJ draft, especially due to the changes that the CLJ brought
to Article 121 of the draft Constitution.72 Before the inclusion of Article
157, 73 Article 121 of the draft Constitution read: “At the request of the
government, or courts, the Supreme Court shall review laws, legislative
decrees, international treaties as well as international covenants for their
compliance with the constitution. The Supreme Court can interpret laws,
legislative decrees and the Constitution.”74
This language in draft Article 121 clearly settled the powers of the
Supreme Court and contained no deferrals. However, the language in draft
Article 121 changed after the CLJ inserted Article 157 in its finalized draft.
The final version of Article 121 reads: “At the request of the government, or
courts, the Supreme Court shall review laws, legislative decrees,
international treaties as well as international covenants for their compliance
with the Constitution, and interpret them in accordance with the law.”75
Unlike the earlier versions of Article 121, in the final version of
Article 121, the Supreme Court is not clearly authorized to interpret the
Constitution.76 The final version of Article 121 directs the Supreme Court to
“interpret them in accordance with the law,” making it difficult to
understand whether or not this includes the interpretation of the
70

Id. (emphasis added).
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Constitution. 77 The matter was complicated because Article 157 did not
make clear whether or not the Commission is tasked with interpreting the
Constitution.78 In fact, both Articles 121 and 157 of the 2004 Constitution
signal deferral through by-law clauses and through strategic constitutional
ambiguity. They do not define the powers of these institutions clearly.
Instead, they leave it to the legislature to adopt a separate law that would
define the powers and organization of the Commission and the powers of the
Supreme Court to exercise judicial review.79
This type of constitutional deferral is extremely dangerous. Although
these deferrals arguably promoted agreement at CLJ negotiations, they later
became the crux of a political crisis over which institution, the Supreme
Court or the Commission, should interpret the Constitution and review the
constitutionality of laws and legislative decrees. 80 They particularly
polarized the relationship between the legislature and the Supreme Court and
undermined the Supreme Court’s legitimacy, independence, and institutional
viability.81 Moreover, the legislature used these constitutional deferrals to
refuse to empower the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and
exercise all types of judicial review functions and to strike at the
independence of the Commission.82 In short, deferrals on the powers of the
Supreme Court and the Commission led to the inability of both institutions
to resolve key constitutional issues.
IV.

THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF DEFERRALS ON THE POWERS OF
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMISSION

The makers of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan deliberately used
deferral as a tool to promote agreement and prevent decision and error
costs.83 Some of these deferrals, such as those on the questions of ideology

77
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of the state and fundamental rights, have proven successful. 84 These
deferrals promoted agreement during the 2002–2004 constitution-making
process and have helped the 2004 Constitution survive for more than
fourteen years thus far.85 Although there has never been clear political or
judicial action clarifying the meaning and the practical impact of the vague
ideological clauses in the 2004 Constitution, the Afghan government and
society both seem to be comfortable leaving the question to the future, at
which point they will have to clarify what these clauses mean and what
practical constraints they place on the government. Therefore, this deferral
arguably leads to the survival of the 2004 Constitution into the distant
future.86
However, some of the deferrals in the 2004 Constitution have not
been successful. The history of the 2004 Constitution thus far suggests that
deferrals on the powers and organization of the Supreme Court and the
Commission have not fared well. In the absence of clear constitutional
provisions settling the very important question of the powers of the Supreme
Court and the Commission, the political branches of the government—the
executive and the legislature—took the responsibility to define the power
and organization of these two institutions.87 However, the legislature and
the executive prepared legislation in a way that attempted to increase their
control and influence over both the Supreme Court and the Commission.88
In fact, the executive and the legislature competed with each other to get the
most out of this ambiguous constitutional formula. 89 The powers,
independence, and institutional security of the Supreme Court and the
Commission were the ultimate victims of the rivalry between the executive
and the legislature to exert influence on the Supreme Court and the
Commission.90
Initially, after the 2004 Constitution was promulgated, the Supreme
Court assumed the power to interpret the Constitution, provide legal advice,

84
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and exercise all judicial review functions. 91 From 2005 to 2007, the
Supreme Court issued a number of decisions and tried to claim jurisdiction
over disputes stemming from the implementation of law and the exercise of
legal authority between the legislature and the executive.92 For example,
after the 2004 presidential elections and the 2005 elections for the
Parliament’s lower house, the Afghan government failed to hold district
council elections.93 As a result, the upper house of the Parliament could not
be constitutionally elected because one-third of its members were to be from
district councils.94 President Karzai asked the Supreme Court to rule on how
to constitute the upper house properly in the absence of district council
elections.95 The Supreme Court ruled that, when district council elections
are not held, provisional councils should elect two-thirds of the members of
the upper house.96 In normal circumstances, provisional councils elect onethird of the members of the upper house. 97 Based on the opinion of the
Supreme Court, provincial councils elected two-thirds of the upper house.
Similarly, in 2006, another constitutional dispute emerged between
the legislature and the executive over the meaning of the word “akthariyyat”
(majority) in parliamentary votes to approve governmental ministers and
Supreme Court justices. 98 The question was whether “majority votes”
included the majority votes of all members of the Parliament or the majority
votes of those members present in a particular parliamentary session. 99
Again, President Karzai asked the Supreme Court to rule on this question.100
The Supreme Court held that akthariyyat in parliamentary votes to approve

91
Id.; see also KAMALI, supra note 71, at 11 n.38; Mohammad Qasim Hashimzai, The Separation of
Power and the Problem of Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC
COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 675–76 (Rainer Grote & Tilmann J. Roder eds., 2012).
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cabinet ministers and the Supreme Court justices meant the majority votes of
members present in a particular parliamentary session.101
The Supreme Court’s decisions were apparently accepted, and they
seemed to demonstrate that the Supreme Court possessed the final legal
authority to invalidate legislation, interpret the Constitution, and resolve
political disputes between the political branches of the government. 102
During this time, the legislature did not exercise its right to resolve
constitutional deferrals on the powers of the Supreme Court and the
Commission.103 As a result, the Supreme Court continued to exercise its
right to perform judicial review and interpret the Constitution without any
opposition.104
A.

Resolving Deferrals on the Powers of the Supreme Court and
the Commission

In May 2007, the Afghan Parliament voted to remove the thenForeign Minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, from his ministerial post. The
Parliament accused the Foreign Minister of failing to prevent the forceful
deportation of Afghan refugees from Iran. 105 President Karzai did not
recognize the Parliament’s decision and challenged the Parliament’s removal
powers before the Supreme Court. 106 The Supreme Court ruled that,
although the Parliament had an implied constitutional right to remove a
government minister, the Parliament did not follow appropriate procedures
in removing Minister Spanta.107 The Parliament refused to acknowledge the
Supreme Court’s ruling, arguing that the Supreme Court did not have the
power to invalidate the Parliament’s decision to remove government
ministers under Article 121 of the Constitution. 108 The Parliament
maintained that Article 121 of the Constitution only gave the Supreme Court
101
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the power to review the constitutionality of laws, not the power to invalidate
Parliament’s power to appoint or remove a government minister. 109 In other
words, the Parliament argued that the Supreme Court did not have
jurisdiction to resolve political disputes between the legislature and the
executive. As such, confusion arose over which institution could resolve
such disputes.110
In response to this crisis, the executive and the legislature both tried to
clarify the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Commission by opting
to resolve constitutional deferrals in Articles 121 and 157.111 They chose to
adopt the constitutionally-mandated legislation that would define the powers
and organization of the Supreme Court and the Commission.112 However,
the executive and the legislature designed the constitutionally-mandated
laws in a way that would considerably increase the control of the political
branches over the judiciary, thereby weakening both the Supreme Court and
the Commission. 113 These laws specifically limited the powers of the
Supreme Court and the Commission to safeguard the Constitution. They
stripped the Supreme Court of its power to exercise all types of judicial
review and to interpret the Constitution.114
To resolve this jurisdictional question, the Supreme Court first
proposed legislation that would clarify its authority. 115 Specifically, the
Supreme Court proposed an amendment to the Law on the Organization and
Jurisdiction of the Courts (2005). The amendment would explicitly allow
the Supreme Court to exercise judicial review, interpret the Constitution, and
resolve other disputes resulting from the application of law and the exercise
of legal authority between the legislature and the executive (cases like that
of Minister Spanta). 116 However, the Parliament rejected the Supreme
Court’s amendment proposal. It declared that, under Article 121, the
Supreme Court did not have the power to interpret the Constitution,
109
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invalidate the Parliament’s power to remove a government minister, or
resolve political disputes between the legislature and the executive.117
When the Parliament rejected the Supreme Court’s proposed
amendment to the Law on the Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts,
the executive drafted a law on the Commission under Article 157 of the
Constitution attempting to resolve the constitutional deferral. 118 This law
would have allowed the Commission to perform a priori review of
governmental bills before the Parliament’s approval and provide legal advice
to the president on questions emerging from the Constitution. 119 The
executive’s proposed legislation also empowered the Commission to review
the laws of previous governments for their compliance with the Constitution
and advise the president in this respect; the president would then take the
required action.120 Nevertheless, the Parliament amended the draft law of
the Commission. The Parliament removed the explicit language that
empowered the Commission to provide an advisory opinion on legislation
before the approval of the Parliament.121 Instead, the Parliament included a
provision that vested in the Commission the power to interpret the
Constitution on the request of the president, the Parliament, and the Supreme
Court.122
President Karzai vetoed this legislation because he believed that the
language in Article 8 of the law of the Commission, which empowered the
Commission to interpret the Constitution, violated the Constitution. 123
President Karzai specifically argued that: (1) Article 121 of the Constitution
empowered only the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and (2) the
Constitution gave the Commission only the power to oversee the
implementation of the Constitution and not the authority to interpret it.124
The Parliament overrode President Karzai’s veto by two-thirds majority,
making it enforceable legislation. 125 President Karzai then asked the
117
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Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of the Commission’s law.126
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 8(1) of the law of the Commission,
which authorized the Commission to interpret the Constitution, was
unconstitutional.127 The Supreme Court held that the drafters of the 2004
Constitution intended for the Supreme Court to be the only institution to
interpret the Constitution.128 The Commission was intended to supervise the
implementation of the Constitution and it did not have the right to interpret
the Constitution.129
The Parliament once again rejected the Supreme Court’s ruling,
stating that, although the Supreme Court had the power to review the
constitutionality of legislation, it faced “a conflict of interest” in invalidating
the law of the Commission. 130 Consequently, the Parliament refused to
amend the law of the Commission to accommodate the opinion of the
Supreme Court. 131 Finally, notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme
Court, in May 2010, the Parliament moved to approve candidates appointed
by President Karzai for membership in the Commission under its
“spuriously passed legislation.” 132 In a June 2010 parliamentary session
convened to approve the members of the Commission, Commission
nominees openly acknowledged that they would exercise the Commission’s
authority to interpret the Constitution and provide legal advice so long as it
maintained the support of the Parliament.133 Upon its creation, and backed
strongly by the Parliament, the Commission undertook the task of
interpreting the Constitution despite opposition from the executive and the
Supreme Court. 134 However, it remains unclear whether or not the
Commission’s opinions are binding.135
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The Final Outcome of Deferrals on the Powers of the Supreme
Court and the Commission

Using constitutional deferrals on the powers of the Supreme Court,
the legislature stripped the Supreme Court of its power to interpret the
Constitution and exercise all judicial review. Furthermore, by adopting
constitutionally-mandated legislation the legislature established a rival
institution, the Commission, and empowered it to interpret the
Constitution. 136 Similarly, soon after the Commission was established in
2010, the executive began to strengthen the Commission vis-à-vis the
Supreme Court. The Commission requested the executive send the
Commission all draft governmental bills for a review of their
constitutionality before approval by the Parliament. 137 In response,
President Karzai issued Decree No. 11371 authorizing the Commission to
perform a priori review of all governmental bills.138 This meant that the
Supreme Court would not be able to exercise a priori review of legislation.
In other words, when the Commission performs a priori review, it precludes
the Supreme Court from performing such a priori reviews of draft bills.139
Moreover, although President Karzai and his government initially
opposed the Commission’s power to interpret the Constitution, shortly after
the Commission was established, they began sending the Commission
interpretive requests on constitutional questions.140 The executive thus, in
essence, acquiesced to the Commission’s power to interpret the Constitution,
perform a priori review of laws, and offer legal advice to the political
branches on constitutional questions. 141 In fact, President Karzai and his
administration began to play a strategic role, submitting simultaneous
requests for judicial review and constitutional interpretation to both the
Supreme Court and the Commission as a “means of hedging bets in case one
institution offered a more favorable opinion.”142
For example, in 2010, a dispute emerged over the result of
136
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parliamentary elections between the government of President Karzai and
Afghanistan’s electoral institutions, the Independent Election Commission
(“IEC”) and the Independent Election Complaints Commission (“IECC”). 143
Karzai claimed the 2010 parliamentary election was plagued with fraud and
systemic electoral engineering.144 The IEC claimed that it had the power to
hear and resolve electoral complaints. 145 Karzai, however, established a
special court to resolve the electoral disputes.146 No laws in Afghanistan,
including the Constitution and electoral laws, provide for a special court to
review election results. 147 The Constitution and electoral laws vest the
power to resolve electoral disputes in the IEC and the IECC.148 The question
of the constitutionality of the Special Election Court (“SEC”) thus caused
consternation. The Commission held the SEC unconstitutional, arguing that
the IEC and the IECC have the power to resolve electoral disputes. 149
Seeing that the Commission declared the SEC unconstitutional, President
Karzai asked the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of the
SEC.150 The Supreme Court promptly ruled that the establishment of the
SEC to investigate electoral complaints was consistent with the
Constitution. 151 The Supreme Court’s decision angered the winning
candidates to the Parliament who refused to accept the opinion of the
Supreme Court, arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was limited to
the review of the constitutionality of legislation under Article 121 of the
Constitution, and that the Supreme Court’s powers did not extend to
resolving electoral disputes.152
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Therefore, constitutional deferrals on the powers of the Supreme
Court and the Commission took Afghan constitutional politics in an
uncharted direction. In the absence of clear constitutional provisions
defining the powers of the Supreme Court and the Commission, the political
branches of the government adopted legislation that vested two different
bodies with the power to interpret the Constitution and exercise different
types of judicial review powers.153 Apparently, politicians and courts alike
have started to treat the vaguely-described Commission as a de facto
constitutional court with the power of pre-promulgation abstract review,
while treating Afghanistan’s Supreme Court as a body empowered to carry
out post-promulgation abstract review of legislation and concrete judicial
review. 154 This dual institutional mechanism is a counterproductive
development that the makers of the 2004 Constitution had hoped to avoid
after they removed the constitutional court from the earlier drafts of the 2004
Constitution.
V.

DEFERRAL AS A TOOL TO UNDERMINE
SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMISSION

THE

INDEPENDENCE

OF THE

Deferrals on the powers of the Supreme Court and the Commission
not only undermined the power, independence, and institutional security of
these two bodies, but also gave the legislature too much power and
discretion vis-à-vis the judiciary. In fact, these deferrals gave the legislature
a tool to use against the Supreme Court and the Commission any time it
desires. The text of Article 121, which in essence describes the Supreme
Court’s judicial review power, leaves many questions open.155 It does not
make clear whether the Supreme Court possesses the power to interpret the
Constitution and exercise all forms of judicial review functions. 156 In
addition, it remains contested to this day which institution can resolve
political disputes that arise between the legislature and the executive (like
the case of Spanta).157 Under the 2004 Constitution, answers to all of these
important questions require the approval of the legislature. Unless the
legislature is willing to resolve them, they will remain unresolved
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indefinitely, or they will be resolved in a way that undermines the powers
and independence of the judiciary.
Although the Supreme Court on several occasions tried to clarify
these questions by proposing constitutionally-mandated legislation under
Article 121, 158 the legislature refused to approve any laws that would
empower the Supreme Court to resolve political cases or interpret the
Constitution. 159 Part of the reason is that, under Article 121 of the
Constitution, only the government and courts have the right to challenge the
constitutionality of legislation and make constitutional interpretation
requests to the Supreme Court. 160 This mechanism does not give the
legislature or other institutions (such as political parties) standing to
challenge the constitutionality of laws or executive action before the
Supreme Court.161 Apparently for this very reason, the legislature refuses to
empower and accept the Supreme Court as a constitutional interpretation
body.
Moreover, in the post-Spanta controversy, the Supreme Court’s
legislative proposals, which attempted to authorize the Supreme Court to
interpret the Constitution and resolve political disputes, created political
backlashes that severely limited the power of the Supreme Court to interpret
the Constitution and to exercise all types of constitutional review
functions. 162 Fearing further repercussions, the Supreme Court tried to
propose legislation to clarify its constitutional jurisdiction—thereby leading
to troubling gaps in Afghanistan’s constitutional review system. 163 For
example, no institution apparently has the power to resolve a dispute that
stems from the implementation of law and the exercise of legal authority
between the legislature and the executive. 164 As a result, many recent
constitutional disputes between the legislature and the executive were
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ultimately resolved through politics and political intervention without the
intervention of either the Supreme Court or the Commission.165
The Supreme Court is not the only institution that has suffered
because the drafters of the 2004 Constitution decided to defer on its powers.
Today, the Commission is in an awkward position, primarily because of
deferrals on its powers and organization. 166 While the Parliament
empowered the Commission to interpret the Constitution and perform a
priori review of governmental bills, it has usually resorted to retaliatory
measures every time the Commission has decided a case in a way that has
not secured the interests of the Parliament.167 For instance, in the later years
of President Karzai’s term, when the Commission issued a large number of
interpretive and advisory opinions that favored the executive,168 Parliament
retaliated by impeaching the Commission’s members and refusing to
approve the sitting members in office for a second term. 169 In addition, the
Parliament has several times threatened to amend the law of the Commission
and strip it of its constitutional interpretation and abstract constitutional
review powers—threats that have severely undermined the independence
and institutional viability of the Commission.170
For example, in July 2016, on the request of President Ashraf Ghani,
the Commission issued an opinion clarifying the legal status of Presidential
Decree No. 159 on election reform.171 The lower house of the Parliament,
165
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the Wolesi Jirga, had rejected Presidential Decree No. 159.172 The upper
house, however, had approved the decree.173 A joint commission of the two
houses was required by law.174 However, before the joint commission could
decide the fate of Decree No. 159, the Parliament went on a summer
recess.175 President Ashraf Ghani referred Presidential Decree No. 159 to
the Commission and requested its opinion on (1) the legal status of Decree
No. 159, (2) whether the president could issue another decree on electoral
reform during parliamentary recess, and (3) whether the president was
required to submit the new electoral reform decree to the Parliament for
approval after it reconvened.176
The Commission held that, when a joint commission of the two
houses of the Parliament rejects a presidential decree, the decree becomes
legally invalid.177 However, the Commission stated that the president could
issue another electoral reform decree when the Parliament is in recess. 178
The Commission further clarified that the president is not required to submit
the new electoral reform decree to the Parliament for approval in the
Parliament’s last year in office under Article 109 of the Constitution. 179
Article 109 of the Constitution states that any proposals for amending the
election laws should not be included in the agenda of the Parliament for
consideration in the final year of its term. 180 Citing this Article, the
Commission held that the president is not required to seek the approval of
the Parliament on the new electoral reform decree because the Parliament is
in the last year of its term. 181 Two earlier electoral reform decrees had
already been rejected by the Parliament.182 The Parliament expected that the
2016),
01242.
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executive would submit any electoral reform decree for approval to the
Parliament after it reconvened. However, this did not happen and the next
presidential decree on electoral reform became enforceable law without
parliamentary approval.183
The Parliament reacted strongly to the Commission’s opinion on
Presidential Decree No. 159 and threatened to retaliate.184 The Parliament
first tried to impeach the members of the Commission and summoned them
for questioning.185 However, the members of the Commission refused to
respond to the request of the Parliament.186 They stated that the Parliament
did not have the right to impeach the members of the Commission.187 The
Commission argued that the Parliament could only impeach governmental
ministers and the justices of the Supreme Court under the Constitution, not
the members of the Commission. 188 This move further infuriated the
Parliament; it argued that it had the right to impeach any government official
to whom it gives a vote of confidence.189 The Commission still chose not to
appear before the Parliament for questioning.190
When the Parliament failed to impeach the members of the
Commission, it then threatened to resort to further retaliatory measures to
undermine the independence of the Commission.191 Chief among them, the
Parliament warned that it would amend the law of the Commission to reduce
the Commission’s powers over constitutional questions, specifically its
power to interpret the Constitution, provide legal advice, and perform a
priori review of legislation.192 This threat forced the Commission to issue
an opinion clarifying its position and trying to calm the increasing rift with
the Parliament,193 but the Parliament was not convinced.194
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Although the Parliament has not yet decided when (and whether) to
amend the law of the Commission, its threat to do so has been a direct attack
on the independence of the Commission. Indeed, the Parliament might not
choose to strip the Commission of its power to interpret the Constitution and
offer legal advice on constitutional matters because doing so will eliminate
the venue in which the Parliament can challenge governmental conduct for
constitutionality and request interpretive constitutional opinions. However,
the fact that the Parliament threatened to amend the law of the Commission
is a clear warning that going against the Parliament might trigger severe
repercussions and political backlash that would undermine the legitimacy,
independence, impartiality, and institutional security of the Commission,
thus reducing its power.
This threat has already proved to be effective. In November 2016,
Parliament voted to strip seven cabinet ministers of their ministerial posts
over their failure to spend seventy percent of their developmental budget.195
President Ashraf Ghani requested that the Supreme Court examine the
constitutionality of the Parliament’s decision to remove these ministers.196
Parliament reacted strongly to the president’s referral and argued that the
Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear such cases under Article 121
of the Constitution.197 Despite opposition from the Parliament, the Supreme
Court decided to review the constitutionality of the Parliament’s power to
remove these ministers from office. 198 Interestingly, however, the
Commission was reluctant to enter into this debate. The Commission stated
that, although the Parliament has a legal right to summon and impeach
governmental ministers, the current series of impeachments shall be assessed
by the Supreme Court to determine whether the removal of ministers by the
Parliament has been “explicit” and “based on convincing reasons,” as
described in Article 92 of the Constitution.199 It seems that the Commission
did not try to seek jurisdiction over this dispute, which clearly involved
constitutional interpretation. Apparently, the Commission feared that its
195
See MPs Dismiss Another Minister, Bringing Total to 7 in 4 Days, TOLONEWS (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/28355-mps-dismiss-another-minister-bringing-total-to-7-in-4-days;
Afghan Govt Reacts Strongly as Parliament Dismiss 3 Ministers, KHAAMA PRESS (Nov. 12, 2016, 8:27
PM), http://www.khaama.com/afghan-govt-reacts-strongly-as-parliament-dismiss-3-ministers-02264.
196
See Afghan Govt Reacts Strongly as Parliament Dismiss 3 Ministers, supra note 195.
197
See Mirabed Joyenda, Govt Criticized for Its Issues Around the Dismissal of Ministers,
TOLONEWS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/govt-criticized-its-issues-arounddismissal-ministers.
198
Pasarlay, When Courts Decide Not to Decide, supra note 82.
199
AFG. CONST. 2004 art. 92; see also Pasarlay, When Courts Decide Not to Decide, supra note 82.

June 2018

The Limits of Constitutional Deferral

711

decision might create strong opponents who would reject its decision, which
may in turn threaten its independence and institutional viability.
In this way, the political branches of the government have taken
advantage of constitutional deferrals on the powers of the Supreme Court
and the Commission to threaten the Court and the Commission’s
institutional security, undermine their independence and impartiality, and
limit their powers. Moreover, the Parliament is basically taking the law of
the Commission hostage, using it against the Commission whenever the
Commission issues an opinion that does not secure the interests of the
Parliament. The matter is further complicated because both the Supreme
Court and the Commission have no means to resist the Parliament in this
respect.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Theorists of constitutional deferral argue that an optimal level of
constitutional deferral provides a significant and valuable mechanism for
constitutional writers. 200 Constitutional deferrals might help promote
agreement at the constitution drafting and ratifying stage. Deferral might
further increase constitutional flexibility by explicitly entrusting
constitutional questions to the legislature by authorizing or requiring them to
address some constitutionally significant questions via sub-constitutional
legislation. This technique might lead to the survival of formal written
constitutions and help promote constitutional stability.201 At the same time,
however, deferral is not optimal for all constitutional issues. It is important
that constitutional framers do not rely heavily on deferral. Specifically, they
should settle important procedural questions in the constitution so that the
function of government is not impeded. 202 Theorists of constitutional
deferral argue that if too many significant constitutional questions are
explicitly deferred to ordinary legislation, the constitution might become
more fragile and have less longevity.203
Importantly, thus far, the history of the 2004 Constitution of
Afghanistan suggests that in addition to the constitutional fragility created
200
201
202
203
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through the use of too many deferrals, deferring to articulate the powers of
the institutions entrusted to resolve other deferrals may also create
constitutional instability. Deferral on the powers and organization of such
institutions may result in direct political conflicts between the judiciary and
the legislation because deferral politicizes the relationship between the
legislature and the judiciary. The politicization of the relationship between
the legislature and the judiciary might in turn put the institutional security
and independence of the judiciary at stake. Particularly, in fragile and
transitioning democracies like Afghanistan, these types of deferrals create
serious problems. In these new democracies, the legislature may be illequipped to deal with unresolved issues of the powers and organization of
apex courts. In such contexts, as occurred in Afghanistan, unresolved
questions of the powers of institutions expected to resolve implicit deferrals
engender costly political crises every time a dispute emerges between the
legislature and the executive. Furthermore, such deferrals lead to the failure
of apex constitutional courts to resolve some key constitutional questions.
The history of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan suggests that it is
important that constitutional designers decide the important question of the
powers of constitutional interpretation bodies in the text of the constitution.
If constitutions defer on these questions, downstream legislatures may refuse
to empower such institutions, leading to political tension among the various
branches of the government. More controversially, downstream legislatures
might simply take by-law deferrals hostage and keep constitutional review
and constitutional interpretation bodies under their watch by threatening to
amend their law and strip them of their powers any time it favors the
legislature.
The decision of the makers of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan to
defer on the powers of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution, and
on the mandate of the Commission and the subsequent reactionary
parliamentary legislations clearly highlight these dangers. In the Afghan
example, we see how the legislature used by-law deferrals not only to
undermine the independence of the Supreme Court but also to create a rival
constitutional interpretation body—the Commission—thereby limiting the
powers of the Supreme Court. As a result, there is no unified hierarchical
institutional mechanism to interpret the Constitution and exercise all types of
constitutional review. Instead, many constitutional disputes are resolved
through politics rather than judicial intervention.
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Finally, deferral on the powers of the Supreme Court and the
Commission has led to a troubling gap in Afghanistan’s judicial review
system. Today, no institution can hear and resolve disputes stemming from
the implementation of law and the exercise of legal authority between the
legislature and the executive (cases like that of Minister Spanta). Although
the Supreme Court tried to clarify this question in the aftermath of the
Spanta controversy, the Parliament rejected the Supreme Court’s proposal,
which also triggered a political backlash against the institutional security of
the Supreme Court. As a result, the question remains unclear because the
legislature simply does not want to have the Supreme Court (or any other
institution for that matter) serve as a check on its powers, especially on its
power to appoint and remove government ministers and Supreme Court
justices. This deferral has further deprived Afghanistan of a crucial
mechanism to institutional democracy by safeguarding the Constitution.
In short, authorizing or requiring the legislature to address the powers
and organization of apex courts via sub-constitutional lawmaking is
dangerous because downstream legislatures will rarely limit their own
powers by such authorization of courts. Constitution makers need to decide
what powers these institutions shall enjoy, thus avoiding constitutional crises
of the type we saw in Afghanistan. If constitution makers do not address
these questions, the legislatures will likely never address them—leading to
direct conflicts between the legislature and the judiciary. If not addressed,
these conflicts will undermine the independence, authority, and institutional
security of the judiciary.
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